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I
R OUR FERTILIZER WORKS, an Illinois corporation, has a
claim against Sanders, a citizen and resident of Texas. It con-
templates an action at law to reduce this claim to judgment.
Before bringing suit it makes an investigation to find out whether or not
Sanders has any property on which it could levy an attachment or execu-
tion to satisfy a judgment. It finds that he has no tangible property-
such as cattle, land, automobiles, etc.--subject to attachment or execu-
tion. It does discover, however, that the Garnishee Company, a cor-
poration organized under the laws of Connecticut and lawfully transacting
business in Illinois as well as in Connecticut, owes Sanders a simple con-
tract debt. Sanders may have a valuable asset in this chose in action
against the Garnishee Company. By assignment he could dispose of it for
value. In short it is "property." In the absence of some prohibition im-
posed by some competent law some method should exist whereby Armour
Fertilizer Works could compel the application of the proceeds of Sanders'
claim against the Garnishee Company to the satisfaction of any judgment
that Armour Fertilizer Works might recover against him. By legal process
Armour Fertilizer Works should be able to collect directly the amount the
Garnishee Company is adjudged to owe Sanders and apply such collection
in partial or total satisfaction of the amount he is adjudged to owe Armour
Fertilizer Works.
Conceivably the law might permit Armour Fertilizer Works to bring an
action against Sanders in Texas, perhaps the only state in which a per-
sonal judgment could be recovered against him. Contemporaneously with
the institution of this action, on the petition of Armour Fertilizer Works
filed in Connecticut or Illinois against the Garnishee Company, the latter
would be enjoined from paying its debt to Sanders pending the outcome
of the Texas action. If Armour Fertilizer Works recovered judgment
against Sanders in the Texas action, the Texas court would order such
judgment satisfied out of the proceeds of the debt that the court in the
Connecticut or Illinois suit might adjudge the Garnishee Company to owe
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Sanders. Armour Fertilizer Works would then proceed in the court of
Connecticut or Illinois (in whichever of those states the second suit had
been filed) to have the Garnishee Company adjudged a debtor to Sanders
and to have the amount of such debt determined, to have payment of
such debt ordered made into court and to have such payment applied
on the Texas judgment theretofore recovered by Armour Fertilizer Works
against Sanders.
Substitute France for Connecticut or Illinois in the foregoing case.
Armour Fertilizer Works might accomplish its ends as indicated. A
French court might enjoin payment of the debt due from the Garnishee
Company to Sanders pending the outcome of the Texas action against
him brought by Armour Fertilizer Works. If in that Texas action Armour
Fertilizer Works were to recover a judgment against Sanders, the French
court might then direct and compel payment of it to be made from the
proceeds of the debt due from the Garnishee Company to Sanders.'
American law, however, has not developed a process like that just
described and like that which seems to have been developed in France.
In spite of any arguments that may be made in its favor, such process is
awkward and cumbersome. Not unnaturally Armour Fertilizer Works
wishes, if possible, in one suit to have Sanders adjudged to be its debtor
and the Garnishee Company adjudged to be the debtor of Sanders. In
this same suit Armour Fertilizer Works wishes to force the payment into
court of the Garnishee Company's debt to Sanders in order to secure the
satisfaction of its own judgment against Sanders.
Under some circumstances this may be done. For example, assume that
Armour Fertilizer Works could secure personal service of process upon
Sanders in Connecticut and that Connecticut permits an action by a non-
resident corporation against a non-resident. The Garnishee Company, a
Connecticut corporation, is subject to suit in that state. There is no doubt
that Connecticut may then allow a suit by Armour Fertilizer Works
against Sanders and the Garnishee Company for a twofold purpose: first,
to reduce to judgment the claim of Armour Fertilizer Works against San-
ders; secondly, to enforce satisfaction of such judgment-out of thepro-
ceeds of the debt that the Garnishee Company is adjudged to owe San-
ders.2 Such a suit is described as one in foreign attachment, garnishment
I See the account in Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a
Debt, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 107, 123 (1913). The author gives an account of Todesco v. Dumont,
Civil Tribunal Seine, March 8, i8go, 18 Clunet 559 (i8go). An account of that case is also
given in i Beale, Cases on the Conflict of Laws 339 (1928).
2 See Conn. Gen. Stat. 1930, §§ 5763 et seq.; Parker, Peebles & Knox v. El Saieh, X07 Conn.
545,141 Atl. 884 (1928).
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or trustee process. In this article one in the position of Armour Fertilizer
Works will sometimes be designated as the principal creditor or garnishee
creditor. One in the position of Sanders, who is both a debtor and a
creditor, will at times be designated as the principal debtor or as the
debtor-creditor, and one in the position of the Garnishee Company as the
garnishee debtor or, simply, as the garnishee.
Return now to the state of facts in which Texas is the only state in
which Armour Fertilizer Works can secure a judgment against Sanders
on personal service. Assume that the Garnishee Company is not subject
to suit in Texas. Armour Fertilizer Works brings an action in garnishment
in Connecticut against Sanders and the Garnishee Company. Sanders is
served only by publication. Personal service is had on the Garnishee
Company as garnishee of the debt it owes Sanders. The Connecticut court
finds that the Garnishee Company owes Sanders and that Sanders owes
Armour Fertilizer Works. Because Connecticut is the state in which the
Garnishee Company is incorporated, and because Sanders could have sued
there on his claim, the Connecticut court can render a judgment against
the Garnishee Company compelling it to pay the amount it has been so
adjudged to owe Sanders into court for application, in whole or in part,
in payment of the amount Sanders has been adjudged to owe Armour
Fertilizer Works.3 It is immaterial that Sanders is not a citizen or resident
of Connecticut. 4 The Connecticut court has jurisdiction to garnish the
debt from the Garnishee Company to Sanders. So far, so good; but sup-
pose that later Sanders sues the Garnishee Company in some other state,
S-i, to recover on the debt that has been garnished in the Connecticut
suit brought by Armour Fertilizer Works. Has the Garnishee Company
any defense by virtue of the Connecticut judgment? That judgment
against the Garnishee Company is, by virtue of the full faith and credit
clause of the federal Constitution, a bar to the prosecution of Sanders'
later action s save in some exceptional circumstances such as are men-
tioned in the next paragraph. True, if an appeal from the Connecticut
judgment is pending, the later action in the other state, S-i, is, perhaps,
only to be continued, or the enforcement of a judgment for Sanders in S-1
suspended, until final determination of the Connecticut appeal.6 The ulti-
mate aim has been to save the Garnishee Company, the garnishee, from
double liability-from liability to Sanders, the principal debtor, after the
3 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899), approved in King
v. Cross, 175 U.S. 396, 399 (x899) and Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U.S. 334, 341 (1902).
4 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899). s Ibid.
6 See Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710, 713 (1899).
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Connecticut judgment in garnishment-fully as much as to enable Ar-
mour Fertilizer Works, the principal or garnishee creditor, to realize upon
an asset of Sanders, viz., his claim against the Garnishee Company.7
Sanders, the principal debtor, has received less consideration. The Con-
necticut court could not, indeed, under the circumstances just supposed
give a valid judgment in personam against him.' The requisite jurisdiction
in personam over him would be lacking.9 Yet a judgment in Connecticut
against the Garnishee Company, Sanders' debtor, in favor of Sanders'
creditor, it has been seen, may bar any subsequent attempt by Sanders
to recover upon his claim against the Garnishee Company. His interests
have been held sufficiently protected if he received such notice of the
pendency of the garnishment action in Connecticut as would enable him
to put in a defense to the claim of Armour Fertilizer Works or if, possibly,
the Garnishee Company as garnishee pleaded any exemption that might
be allowed Sanders under the law of the forum or under his domiciliary
law.o If he were served only constructively in the Connecticut garnish-
ment suit, as has been assumed, and if the Garnishee Company as gar-
nishee did not give him the requisite notice of the pendency thereof, the
Connecticut judgment against the garnishee would not bar Sanders' later
suit in S-i against the Garnishee Company,"T especially if there had been
collusion between Armour Fertilizer Works (the principal creditor) and
the garnishee.12
Jurisdiction to garnish a simple contract debt, then, seems coterminous
with jurisdiction to render a judgment in personam against the garnishee
debtor.13 If the garnishee debtor is a corporation, such jurisdiction cer-
7 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 226 (19o5).
8 See statements in Planters' Chemical & Oil Co. v. Wallar, i6o Ala. 217, 224, 49 So. 89, 9i
(igog); Veeder Mfg. Co. v. Marshall-Sanders Co., 79 Conn. 15, 17, 63 Ati. 641, 642 (19o6);
Templeton v. Van Dyke, r69 Minn. i88, 19i, 2io N.W. 874, 875 (1926); Kemper-Thomas
Paper Co. v. Shyer, io8 Tenn. 444, 67 S.W. 856 (1902).
9 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 747 (1878).
10 See Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710, 718 (i899). See also
statements in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 227-228 (19o5) and In re Beals, 116 Fed. 530,
532 (D.C. Ind. 1902); and cf. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Hostetter, 240 U.S. 620 (i916).
z Cf. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (igo5), and Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Hostetter, 240
U.S. 620 (i916).
- For a case where there may have been collusion see Stewart v. Northern Assurance Co.,
45 W. Va. 734, 32 S.E. 218 (1898).
13 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (x9o5). See also statements in H. Williamson, Ltd. v.
Phinney-Walker Co., 247 Mich. 645, 647, 226 N.W. 672 (1929); Templeton v. Van Dyke,
i69 Minn. 188, 191-93, 21o N.W. 874, 875-76 (1926), which explains and discusses earlier
Minnesota cases; Bingenheimer Mercantile Co. v. Weber, 49 N.D. 312, 317, 191 N.W. 620,
621 (1922).
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tainly exists in the state of incorporation. In the initial United States
Supreme Court case on the problemX4 garnishment outside the state of
incorporation of a garnishee debtor was not considered. In Harris v.
Balk,5 however, a judgment was rendered against a natural person as
garnishee in Maryland, in which he was served while only temporarily
present. The principal debtor was served only constructively. This judg-
ment against the garnishee was held to be a bar to a later action against
him in his domicil, North Carolina, which the debtor-creditor instituted
for the recovery of the debt that had been the subject of the garnishment
in Maryland. "Power over the person of the garnishee confers jurisdic-
tion on the courts of the state where the writ issues."' 6 To dispose of the
contention that it was necessary that jurisdiction be had of the person
of the debtor-creditor as a prerequisite to jurisdiction to garnish, the
court declared that the garnishee creditor sued as agent for the debtor-
creditor.'7 The fictitious character of such an agency has been sufficiently
pointed out elsewhere. 8 In the hypothetical case under consideration,
therefore, Armour Fertilizer Works would not be limited to Connecticut
if it wished to sue in garnishment. The Garnishee Company is assumed
to be lawfully engaged in business in Illinois and subject to suit there.
Armour Fertilizer Works could bring a garnishment action in that state. 9
If Sanders were served only constructively, but personal service were had
on the Garnishee Company, the same results could follow as we have
seen might result from the Connecticut garnishment suit.
Under the decision in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm,20
as extended in Harris v. Balk, reasonable assurance of freedom from dou-
ble liability was granted a garnishee who had paid a judgment recovered
against it on personal service in any of the United States.2 Creditors had
assurance of considerable facility in realizing upon debts owed to their
X4 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899).
Is 198 U.S. 215 (19os). '16 d. at 222. X7Id. at 226.
18 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 129-30 (1927); Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in
Ren to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 107, 121-22 (1913).
'9 This appears from Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934).
2o 174 U.S. 710 (1899).
"1 In cases where the probability was that a garnishee might later be held liable abroad to
the principal debtor, who had been served only constructively in the garnishment suit, courts
have refused to enter judgment against the garnishee: Weitzel v. Weitzel, 27 Ariz. x17, 230
Pac. iio6 (1924); and cf. Parker, Peebles & Knox v. National Fire Ins. Co., iLi Conn. 383,
iro Atl. 313 (193o) and Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 3o3, 184
N.E. 152 (i933). See also dictum in Kidder v. Packard, 13 Mass. 80, 82 (i816). If a garnishee
is sued abroad by the principal debtor while the garnishment suit is pending, the duty rests
on the garnishee to bring the pendency of the garnishment suit to the attention of the foreign
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debtors by third persons, especially when the garnishee debtor was a
corporation subject to suit in more than one state.22 Some critics did fear
that a fraudulent garnishment action would often be brought in a state
far removed from the domicil of the principal debtor.23 Others felt that
Harris v. Balk furnished adequate protection against such a danger by
its warning that ordinarily "the failure on the part of the garnishee to
give proper notice to his creditor of the levying of the attachment would
be such a neglect of duty on the part of the garnishee .... as would
prevent his availing himself of the judgment in the attachment suit as a
bar to the suit of his creditor against himself ..... 124 From the reported
cases it may well be that employees of interstate railroads have good
reason to complain of the two United States Supreme Court cases just
cited. An employee of an interstate railroad finds that his wages have been
garnished in a state in which his employer (the railroad) is subject to
suit, but in which he is neither domiciled nor employed and in which the
wages have not been earned and are not payable.2 5 The amount at stake
in such a suit is often so small that it is not unreasonable to assume that
the expense of defending against the claim of his alleged creditor forces
the railroad employee to submit to the garnishment of his wages in a
foreign state at the suit of one whose claim is of dubious legality. This
hardship may, perhaps, be removed by statutes, such as those which
make it an offense for a creditor, with intent to evade the state exemption
laws, to send a claim out of the state for collection by garnishment when
all the parties (the principal creditor, the principal debtor and the gar-
nishee) are within the jurisdiction of the courts of the state.26
court: Bayer v. Lovelace, 204 Mass. 327, 90 N.E. 538 (I910). If the garnishee does not do so,
a judgment by such foreign court against him is no bar to judgment against him in the garnish-
ment suit.
"E.g., Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Deer, 200 U.S. 176 (I9O6).
23 Beale, The Exercise of jurisdiction in Ren to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 Harv. L.
Rev. 107, 121-22 (1913).
24 Carpenter, jurisdiction over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment,
and Taxation, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 9o5, 915-18 (igi8).
2s See, for example, Pittsburg, C.C. & St.L. Ry. Co. v. Bartels, io8 Ky. 216, 56 S.W. 152
(29oo); Williams v. St. Louis & S.W. Ry. Co., i09 La. 90,33 So. 94 (1902); Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. Co. v. Swartz, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 389, XI5 S.W. 275 (i909); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Allen, 58 W. Va. 388, 52 S.E. 465 (i9o5).
26 E.g., Ga. Code 1933, §§ 46-2o9, 210, 211, and 46-99oi; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, C. 52,
20-21; Burns Ind. Stat. 1933, § 10-49o4; Iowa Code 1935, § 11770; N.C. Code 1935, §§ 6568-
72 (forbidding transmission of contract claims against a "resident wage-earner or other sala-
ried employee of any railway corporation or other corporation, firm, or individual engaged in
inter-state business"); Wis. Stat. 1935, § 343-407.
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Harris v. Balk was concerned with the duty of a court to give full faith
and credit to the judgment of a court of a sister state against a garnishee
debtor. However, it has persuaded many state courts to adopt or to
reaffirm the doctrine that, whenever state statutes so permit, personal
jurisdiction over the garnishee debtor suffices to give jurisdiction in gar-
nishment of a simple contract debt.27 Non-residence of the debtor-creditor
may be regarded as immaterial.28 So also may the place where the gar-
nished debt has been contracted.29 And the place where it is payable.30
With such reasonable assurance of freedom from double liability a
garnishee debtor was supposed to occupy a position of neutrality as an
indifferent stakeholder..' It was no concern of his who ultimately col-
lected the debt he owed-the garnishee creditor or the principal debtor.
Payment of a judgment in favor of the principal creditor discharged the
garnishee from liability to the debtor-creditor.3
Suppose that several plaintiffs seek in separate suits in different states
to garnish a corporation that is subject to suit in each state for a debt
due one who is alleged to be indebted to each of these plaintiffs. For
example, in states S-i, S-2 and S-3, respectively, A, B and C seek to
recover debts alleged to be due them from D. In their respective actions
against D each of the three plaintiffs (A, B and C) garnishes the Garnishee
Company, a corporation that is lawfully transacting business in states
S-I, S-2 and S-3, and subject to suit in each. Suppose that A's action in
state S-i was the first to be instituted, and that he had served garnish-
27 See, for example, Person v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., x13 Ark. 467, i69 S.W. 223
(x914); H. Williamson, Ltd. v. Phinney-Walker Co., 247 Mich. 645, 226 N.W. 672 (I929);
Southern Pacific R. Co. v. A. J. Lyon & Co., 99 Miss. i86, 54 So. 728 (i9ii); Shiatte v. Singer
Mfg. Co., 8i N.H. 294, 125 Atl. 429 (1924); Bingenheimer Mercantile Co. v. Weber, 49 N.D.
312, i91 N.W. 620 (1922); Bristol v. Brent, 38 Utah 58, iio Pac. 356 (igio), but cf. Mathison
v. Richard, 48 Utah 226, i58 Pac. 787 (iQ6).
28 "The garnishment of a debt due a nonresident by a resident debtor is recognized by our
statutes and by repeated decisions as being a suit in rem against the attached debt, the effect
of which is to subject it to the payment of the amount due the plaintiff. This right to subject
the obligation of nonresident does not, under the holdings of our courts, infringe upon the
sovereignty of the state of the nonresident's domicile." Gerlach Mercantile Co. v. Hughes-
Bozarth-Anderson Co., 189 S.W. 784, 788 (Tex. Civ. App. i916).
29 Person v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 113 Ark. 467, 169 S.W. 223; H. Williamson,
Ltd. v. Phinney-Walker Co., 247 Mich. 645, 226 N.W. 672 (1929).
3o Harvey v. Thompson, 128 Ga. 147, 57 S.E. 104 (1907); Morrison v. Illinois Central R.
Co., zoi Neb. 49, x6i N.W. 1032 (1917).
31 "The relation of the garnishee to the parties is well defined by the authorities. He stands
as a mere stakeholder, and must not voluntarily do anything to the prejudice of the parties.
He must let the law take its course, except he may protect himself from unauthorized acts and
proceedings." Brondum v. Rosenblum, 151 Miss. 91, 98, 117 So. 363, 364 (1928).
32 Garnishment of judgments is not here considered.
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ment process on the Garnishee Company before the institution of B's
action in S-2 or C's in S-3. Would the pendency of A's action in S-i bar
B's later garnishment of the Garnishee Company in S-2? There is at
least one decision that mere pendency of garnishment in one state does
not bar garnishment of the same debt in another state if the garnishee
is a corporation subject to suit in each state.33 That decision has met
with no disapproval by the United States Supreme Court.14 A judgment
recovered in any one of the three states-S-i, S-2 or S-3 , for example-is
entitled to full faith and recognition in each of the others, that is, a judg-
ment against the Garnishee Company as garnishee in one of these states
bars another judgment against it as garnishee of the same debt in other
states, assuming, of course, the absence of any collusion between the
Garnishee Company and the judgment creditor and that requisite notice
was given the principal debtor. That plaintiff will prevail who first secures
a judgment. Here again it seems that the garnishee corporation occupies
the position of stakeholder. In any suit in which the principal debtor is
not personally served, the Garnishee Company is under a duty to notify
the principal debtor of the pendency of the suit, to plead the pendency
of garnishment suits on the same debt in other states, and, perhaps, to
plead any exemptions allowed the principal debtor under his domiciliary
law. Its duties extend no further. It may rely on the first judgment
against it as garnishee to bar the rendition of judgments in other states
on the same debt.
II
The recent case of Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works3s shows that in
certain cases the Federal Interpleader Act 36 makes possible a change in
the position of a corporate garnishee. It is submitted that in certain cases
a corporation that is a garnishee debtor may now exercise some control
as to which of several competing garnishing creditors shall prevail. Its
position is no longer that of a mere stakeholder. Moreover, in those cases,
winning a race to priority of judgment may no longer be a matter of con-
cern to the garnishing creditors themselves. For the sake of clarity
Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works will be stated in detail.
Armour Fertilizer Works, an Illinois corporation, brought an action in
Illinois against Sanders, a citizen and resident of Texas, on notes payable
in Texas. These notes purported to waive all exemption and homestead
rights. Sanders was served by publication only. However, the plaintiff
"3 Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, I65 Ill. 592,46 N.E. 631 (1897).
34 See Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (i934).
3S 292 U.S. 190 (1934).
3649 Stat. io96 (i936); 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (26) (1926) (as amended).
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garnished in Illinois in foreign attachment two Connecticut insurance
companies on their indebtedness to Sanders on policies insuring Texas
premises against fire. The insurers did business in both Illinois and Texas.
In their answers they admitted their respective liabilities, but set up that
Sanders claimed the proceeds as exempt from garnishment under the
Texas homestead laws. Before trial of the issues raised by their answers
the garnishees filed bills under the Federal Interpleader Act 37 in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, in which
Sanders was domiciled, naming him and Armour Fertilizer Works as
adverse claimants. These two interpleader suits were consolidated. The
insurance companies paid the amounts due on the policies into court
which issued a preliminary injunction restraining further proceedings
against the insurance companies in the Illinois action brought by Armour
Fertilizer Works. By this time judgment had been entered against San-
ders in that action, the attachment in garnishment sustained and the
issue of execution ordered. The United States District Court on motion
dismissed the bills in interpleader, holding that the claims of Sanders
and Armour Fertilizer Works were not adverse. 38 The Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the decree3 9 It found the claims of Armour Fertilizer
Works and Sanders to be adverse so as to entitle the insurance companies
to the benefits of the Federal Interpleader Act. Trial on the merits in the
District Court then resulted in a decree for Sanders, but on appeal this
was reversed on the ground that the District Court had not given full
faith and credit to the Illinois judicial proceedings. 4° On certiorari the
United States Supreme Court upheld the Circuit Court of Appeals and
adjudged Armour Fertilizer Works to have the superior "equity" in the
proceeds of the insurance policies. The Chief Justice and Justices Bran-
deis, Cardozo and Stone dissented.
Two cases from the Supreme Court of Illinois were cited by both the
majority and minority as authority for certain of their respective state-
ments. Speaking for the majority, Mr. justice McReynolds said:
The Illinois rule is that garnishment imposes an inchoate lien subject to defeat
by certain subsequent events, none of which are present here. Also, that final judg-
ment in Illinois against the garnishee prior to one in another jurisdiction is conclusive
of the rights of the parties. Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbelts, 165 Ill. 592; 46 N.E. 631;
Becker v. Illinois Central R. Co., 250 Ill. 40; 95 N.E. 42.40
37 The bills were filed under the Act of May 8, 1926, 44 Stat. 416 (1926); 28 U.S.C.A. § 41
(26) (1926).
38 Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 33 F. (2d) x57 (D.C. Tex. 1929).
39 Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 38 F. (2d) 212 (C.C.A. 5th 1930).
40 Armour Fertilizer Works v. Sanders, 63 F. (2d) 902 (C.C.A. 5th 1933).
4' Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 203 (1934).
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According to Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the minority:
The Illinois plaintiff, though the first to have recourse to garnishment, will be post-
poned to the other plaintiff who is first with execution. Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts,
i65 Ill. 592; 46 N.E. 631. Indeed the primary creditor, i.e., the debtor of the attaching
plaintiff, may bring suit against the garnishee in another jurisdiction, and collect the
indebtedness if he wins the race to judgment. Becker v. Illinois Central R. Co., 250
Ill. 4o; 95 N.E. 42.4
The two statements are not inconsistent. Both agree that in Illinois
a plaintiff by the mere service of attachment in garnishment does not
secure an indefeasible right to have any judgment he may recover against
the principal debtor satisfied out of the proceeds of the garnished debt.
Both make priority in time of a judgment against the garnished debtor
in Illinois over a judgment against him elsewhere on the garnished in-
debtedness a material, even a conclusive, factor. What is more, neither
the majority nor the minority group point to any inconsistency in the
act of the other in citing these two Illinois cases. Do these two cases,
then, accord with the decision of the majority and with the decision of
the minority?
In Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts43 a British insurance company, law-
fully transacting business in Illinois and Wisconsin, owed a debt to Cor-
betts, a resident of Wisconsin. A creditor of Corbetts served the insurance
company with an attachment in garnishment of that debt in a suit in
Illinois. Corbetts received only constructive service. Thereafter another
creditor of his sued in Wisconsin and garnished the same indebtedness.
In the Wisconsin action the insurance company pleaded the pendency of
the Illinois garnishment suit. The Wisconsin court, however, reasoned
that Illinois had lacked jurisdiction to garnish this debt due from a British
corporation to a Wisconsin resident. Accordingly, the Wisconsin court
held the plea no defense and gave judgment against the garnishee, which
it paid under compulsion. The garnishee then pleaded the Wisconsin
judgment and such compulsory payment in bar of the Illinois garnish-
ment. The trial and appellate courts of Illinois held against the insurance
company, but on appeal the supreme court of the state decided in its
favor. That court was of the opinion that while the Wisconsin court had
followed unsound reasoning in giving judgment against the insurance
company as garnishee, both Illinois and Wisconsin had jurisdiction in
garnishment because the company could have been sued by its creditor
in either one of those states. Jurisdiction was concurrent. Neither state
had exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, the judgment first rendered was
43 165 I. 592, 46 N.E. 631 (1897).42 Id. at 207.
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valid and enforceable against the garnishee. A second payment of the
debt was not to be compelled. The garnishee was not to stand in any
worse position because of the garnishment. It was not to incur any
greater liability.
Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, read in the light of Harris v. Balk,
dearly gives priority to that one of several garnishee creditors who is the
first to secure judgment against the garnishee debtor. As between several
plaintiffs who in different states are garnishing the same corporate debtor
of their common debtor, preference rests with him who first secures judg-
ment. Such seems to have been the interpretation of both the majority
and minority in the United States Supreme Court. Nowhere in the
opinions of that court in Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works is there any
criticism of the premises of the Illinois Supreme Court in Lancashire Ins.
Co. v. Corbetts that both Illinois and Wisconsin had jurisdiction in gar-
nishment.
In Becker v. Illinois Central R. R. Co.,44 also cited by both majority and
minority of the United States Supreme Court in Sanders v. Armour Fer-
tilizer Works, Miller of Missouri was the assignee of an Illinois creditor of
an Illinois employee of the Illinois Central Railroad. Miller, as such
assignee, brought an action in Missouri against the railroad employee,
serving him only by publication. The railroad was served as garnishee on
its indebtedness to the employee for wages earned in Illinois. In its
answer the railroad company admitted the debt, but pleaded that the
same was exempt from garnishment under the statute of Illinois and that
under the law of Missouri the writ of attachment and garnishment notice
were null and void. It moved for a dismissal of the action as against it.
Thereafter the employee recovered judgment for the wages in question
before a justice of the peace in Illinois, from which the railroad appealed
to the circuit court. Pending that appeal a judgment was entered in the
proceedings in garnishment in Missouri against the railroad as garnishee
and paid. The Illinois circuit court held that the Missouri judgment and
the payment thereof were not a good defense to the employee's action
against the railroad. It gave judgment for the employee. On appeal the
appellate court affirmed this judgment. Upon a certificate of importance
and appeal the supreme court of the state also affirmed the judgment,
saying:
When judgment was rendered against the appellant in this state for wages exempt
from garnishment, payment of the judgment would have been a good defense to the
further prosecution of the suit in Missouri. The appeal to the circuit court was a volun-
44 250 Il. 40, 95 N.E. 42 (1911).
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tary act of the appellant, with the effect of letting in a foreign judgment which had
been rendered against the appellant in Missouri and paid before the trial in the circuit
court. Such a voluntary act in a case where the appellant had no defense to the claim
could not, without injustice, be permitted to affect the rights of the appellee. By the
service of the garnishee summons in Missouri Miller acquired a contingent or inchoate
lien upon the debt and appellant could not thereafter make a voluntary payment to
the appellee, but the right which Miller acquired was dependent upon subsequently
obtaining judgment, and that was not accomplished until a judgment had been re-
covered in this State, where the debt was free from any right or claim that he had.4s
This case is not concerned with the rights of competing garnishee
creditors, as was Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts. The clash is one between
a garnishee creditor and the debtor-creditor. As between those two, how-
ever, the case, read in the light of Harris v. Balk, gives priority to that
party who is the first to secure judgment against the corporate garnishee
debtor. As in Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetis, priority in securing judgment
is the material factor. And such seems to have been the interpretation of
the case by both the majority and minority of the United States Supreme
Court in Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works.
Obviously the United States Supreme Court does not purport to hold
these two Illinois cases unsound. It does not find that the Illinois court
violated or disregarded any provision of the United States Constitution.
Has Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works in any way modified the working
of these Illinois cases? Consideration will now be given that problem.
III
CASE I
Assume the following facts:
The Armour Fertilizer Works commences an action in Illinois against
Sanders. He is served only constructively, but an attachment in garnish-
ment is served on the Garnishee Company, a Connecticut insurance com-
pany. The garnishee in its answer admits its indebtedness to Sanders, but
sets up that the proceeds of his claim against it would be exempt from
garnishment under the Texas homestead laws. A default judgment is
entered against Sanders. 46 Meanwhile in state S-i another action has been
brought against Sanders by another creditor of his, whom we will call X.
4s Id. at 45, o5 N.E. at 43.
46 Such a judgment, of course, would impose no personal obligation on Sanders for lack of
the requisite jurisdiction in personam over him. See statements in Planters' Chemical & Oil
Co. v. Wallar, 16o Ala. 217, 224, 49 So. 89, 9I (i9o9); Veeder Mfg. Co. v. Marshall-Sanders
Co., 79 Conn. IS, 17, 63 Atl. 641, 642 (19o6); Templeton v. Van Dyke, 169 Minn. x88, i91,
210 N.W. 874, 875 (1926); and Kemper-Thomas Paper Co. v. Shyer, io8 Tenn. 444, 67 S.W.
856 (1902), all cited in note 8 supra, and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (x878), cited in
note 9 supra.
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In that action Sanders is personally served. The Garnishee Company is
lawfully transacting business in state S-i as well as in Illinois and in X's
action in state S-i it is served with an attachment in garnishment of the
same debt on which it has already been garnished in Illinois. Again, as in
the Illinois action, the garnishee in its answer admits its indebtedness to
Sanders and sets up the same claim of exemption. It also pleads the
pendency of the garnishment proceeding in Illinois. Before any final
judgment is entered against the Garnishee Company in either Illinois or
state S-i, it files a bill under the Federal Interpleader Act in the United
States District Court in the district in Tbxas in which Sanders is domi-
ciled. He, X and Armour Fertilizer Works are made parties. The Gar-
nishee Company pays the amount at stake into court and is discharged.
Injunctions issue restraining further prosecution of the actions in Illinois
and state S-i. What decision should the federal court render?
In this hypothetical case, as in the reported case of Sanders v. Armour
Fertilizer Works, the United States District Court in Texas will not be
primarily concerned with the rights of a garnishee. The Garnishee Com-
pany has paid its debt into court and obtained a complete discharge. Only
Sanders, X and the Armour Fertilizer Works are interested. Presumably,
also, as in the reported case, Armour Fertilizer Works "asks nothing under
any Texas law."'47 It has been brought into the United States District
Court against its will and held there against its protest. So also has X.
He, too, asks nothing under any Texas law. Armour Fertilizer Works
claims the proceeds of the policy to the exclusion of the other inter-
pleaded parties by virtue of its Illinois attachment in garnishment. X
makes a similar claim by virtue of his attachment in state S-i. Sanders,
while not disputing his obligation to either of these creditors of his,
claims the proceeds by virtue of the Texas homestead exemption statutes.
Both X and the Armour Fertilizer Works admit that the Garnishee Com-
pany is primarily indebted to Sanders and each seeks to recover because
of Sanders' indebtedness to it. Each of the three-Armour Fertilizer
Works, Sanders and X-claims the proceeds of the policy to the exclusion
of the other two. They would seem to be adverse claimants within the
scope of the Federal Interpleader Act.48 In determining who is entitled
to the proceeds of the debt due from the Garnishee Company to Sanders
the court will "weigh the right or title of each claimant under the law of
the state in which it arose, and determine which according to equity is
the better." 49
47 292 U.S. 190, 2o0. 48 Id. at i99.
49 Id. at 200, where the court quotes from the opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals in
63 F. (2d) 902, 9o6 (C.C.A. 5th 1933).
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What, then, as to the right or title of Armour Fertilizer Works in this
hypothetical case? What had it secured under the law of Illinois? It is
in the answer to this question that the majority and minority of the
Supreme Court differed in the reported case of Sanders v. Armour Fer-
tilizer Works. The majority find that Armour Fertilizer Works, by virtue
of the service of the attachment in garnishment, acquired a lien on the
garnished debt subject to defeat if certain events subsequently hap-
pened.5o Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts shows that one of such subsequent
events would have been the recovery of a judgment in state S-i against
the garnishee insurance companies before any judgments were recovered
against them in Illinois. In other words, as has already been pointed out,
Armour Fertilizer Works in the hypothetical case gets an indefeasible
right under the law of Illinois to have the proceeds of the garnished debt
applied in satisfaction of its claim against Sanders only if and when it is
the first to secure a judgment, based on personal service, against the gar-
nished corporation. How can it secure such priority when it has been
enjoined from further prosecution of its Illinois action? How can it pre-
vail in the interpleader suit? Only if the court in that suit deems it
inequitable to hold that because the last step in the Illinois action, i.e.,
the rendering of a judgment against the garnishee, was not taken, either
Sanders or X had in some way become entitled to priority.
In the actual case of Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the injunction against further prose-
cution of the Illinois action could not equitably operate so as to deprive
Armour Fertilizer Works of the "paramount right or superior equity to
the proceeds of the policies" given it by the proceedings in Illinois.5' The
court admittedly was not concerned with a state of facts in which some
other creditor of Sanders was also interested in the garnished debts.52 If no
such other creditor appears on the scene before the decree in interpleader
is rendered, it may be that full faith and credit require that the injunction
against further prosecution of the illinois action should not deprive Ar-
mour Fertilizer Works of any "inchoate lien," "paramount right" or
"superior equity" it had already gained.
However, in the hypothetical case, X, the state S-i creditor of Sanders,
may be able to show that under the law of state S-i the institution of his
action against Sanders and the service upon the Garnishee Company of
his attachment in garnishment would have entitled him to have his judg-
ment against Sanders satisfied out of the proceeds of the garnished debt
in the absence of a prior judgment in some other state rendered, after
so Id. at 20-3. S1Id. at 204. S2 Id. at 205.
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personal service, against the Garnishee Company-either a judgment
against it in garnishment in favor of some other creditor of Sanders5s or a
judgment against it in favor of Sanders as plaintiff.54 Uiader the law of
state S-i, then, X would have a "right" or "equity" not "paramount" or
"superior," perhaps, to that which Armour Fertilizer Works has under
the laws of Illinois, but certainly not inferior. Whom will the United
States District Court in Texas prefer if it seeks to weigh the right or title
of each under the law of the state in which it arose and to determine which
"right" or "equity" is the better? X has been enjoined from further
prosecution of the action in state S-i. He cannot take the "last step" in
state S-i. Would it not be inequitable, according to the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court, to hold that because X had not taken such
"last step" either Armour Fertilizer Works or Sanders had in some way
become entitled to priority-i.e., to the proceeds of the garnished debt?
Would it be equitable for the United States District Court in Texas to
award the fund to Armour Fertilizer Works? True, that claimant has
been enjoined from taking the last step in Illinois-securing a judgment,
based on personal service, against the garnishee. It does not follow, how-
ever, that it has obtained an indefeasible right to the fund, superior to the
claims of other claimants, X, for example. To make this point dear, sup-
pose that no interpleader had been filed in the hypothetical case. While
the suits were pending in Illinois and state S-i, counsel for Armour Fer-
tilizer Works, if learned in the law of Illinois and in the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, would advise the client that it would secure
an indefeasible right to have the proceeds of the garnished debt applied
in payment of its claim against Sanders only if it secured an Illinois judg-
ment against the garnishee before any judgment were entered against
the garnishee in state S-i. Counsel for X, if learned in the law of state
S-i and in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, would advise
X that he would secure an indefeasible right to have the proceeds of the
garnished debt applied in payment of his claim against Sanders only if
he-X--secured a judgment in state S-i against the garnishee before any
judgment were entered against the garnishee in Illinois. With the filing
of the interpleader suit in the hypothetical case it becomes impossible in
practice for a judgment to be recovered in Illinois before a judgment is
recovered in state S-i and equally impossible for a judgment to be re-
covered in state S-i before a judgment is recovered in Illinois. Armour
Fertilizer Works and X have been enjoined from prosecuting their re-
S' See Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, i65 Ill. 592,46 N.E. 631 (I897).
54 See Becker v. Illinois Central R.R. CO., 250 Ill. 40, 95 N.E. 42 (1911).
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spective garnishment suits in Illinois and state S-i. Priority of judgment
in one or the other of those two states cannot be a fact for the court in
the interpleader suit to consider. It is a fact that does not, and in practice
will not, exist. It is absurd to suppose that either Armour Fertilizer Works
or X would disobey the injunctions issued by the court in the interpleader
suit. Yet it is priority of judgment that the Illinois court in Lancashire
Ins. Co. v. Corbetts considers the decisive factor. It seems, therefore, that
so far Armour Fertilizer Works in the hypothetical case has not proven
that under Illinois law it has obtained a "right" or "equity" which the
court in the interpleader case should regard as "paramount" to any
"right" or "equity" that X claims under the law of state S-I, unless
priority in service of garnishment in Illinois over service of garnishment in
state S-i is the decisive factor. If such priority is to be regarded as the
decisive factor and Armour Fertilizer Works is to prevail, then query
whether the court in the interpleader suit is determining the "right" or
"title" of Armour Fertilizer Works under the law of Illinois. It is re-
spectfully submitted that it is not.
On the other hand the court could not award the fund to X consistently
with Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm and Harris v. Balk.
To make this clear, suppose that no interpleader had been filed in the
hypothetical case. Had Illinois been the first to render judgment against
the Garnishee Company, there would have been no doubt as to the obliga-
tion of the court in state S-i to extend full faith and credit to the Illinois
judgment. Yet the court in state S-i might refuse to regard the mere
pendency of the Illinois garnishment suit as a bar to the prosecution of
the suit in state S-i to final judgment against the Garnishee Company.
The Wisconsin court did so refuse in the Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts
situation. No criticism of such refusal is to be found in the Supreme
Court of the United States."5 If the Garnishee Company is a corporation
on which personal service can be had in both Illinois and state S-i, there
seems to be no constitutional reason why pendency of the Illinois garnish-
ment suit should bar the later garnishment suit in state S-i. Now return
to the interpleader suit in Texas in the hypothetical case. Surely the
ss In speaking of garnishment in Illinois Mr. Justice Cardozo says: "The writ has no effect
upon involuntary payments before the stage of judgment. Some other attaching creditor,
suing the same defendant, may garnish the same debt in another jurisdiction. The Illinois
plaintiff, though the first to have recourse to garnishment, will be postponed to the other
plaintiff who is first with execution. Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbefts, 165 Ill. 592, 46 N.E. 631.'!
Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 207 (1933).
Mr. Justice McReynolds says that the Illinois rule is that "inal judgment in Illinois against
the garnishee prior to one in another jurisdiction is dondusive of the rights of the parties.
Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetis, 165 Ill. 592, 46 N.E. 631." Id. at 203:
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court would not prefer X on the theory that it should give full faith and
credit to the garnishment proceedings in state S-i to the exclusion of
those in Illinois. To do so would be to deny that a state in which a gar-
nishee is personally served (Illinois) has jurisdiction to render a judgment
against the garnishee entitled to external recognition under the federal
constitution.
It is hard to believe that the court would dismiss the interpleader suit
and remit the respective plaintiffs in Illinois and state S-i to a race for
priority of judgment, with an added probability of a suit by Sanders. The
Federal Interpleader Act authorizes the court to adjudicate this multi-
cornered dispute. Hard cases may make bad law, but they do not justify
a distorted application of the doctrine of forum non conveiiens.
The minority of the United States Supreme Court in Sanders v. Armour
Fertilizer Works denied that by service of attachment in garnishment
Armour Fertilizer Works acquired under Illinois law a lien on the gar-
nished debt.s 6 The minority included four judges; the majority, five.
Evidently the decision produced a fear in some quarters that in some
subsequent case the Court might reverse its stand and give the Illinois
garnishment statute the interpretation which the minority in Sanders v.
Armour Fertilizer Works thought was the proper one. At any rate the
Illinois General Assembly recently amended the statute regulating attach-
ments in garnishment by providing that those summoned as garnishees
shall thereafter hold any property, effects, choses in action or credits in their possession
or power belonging to the defendant which are not exempt, subject to the court's order
in such proceeding, and shall not pay to the defendant any indebtedness owed to him
subject to such order, and such property .... and debts shall be considered to have
been attached and the plaintiff's claim to have became a lien thereon pending suck suit.S7
It is not unreasonable to suppose that the persons responsible for the
amendment had in mind the statement of Cardozo, J., that
Garnishment and attachment today are statutory remedies. They are what the
state creating them declares that they shall be. It is of no moment that Illinois might
have made their efficacy greater as long as her legislature and courts have preferred to
make them less.sS
The amendment, seemingly, was designed to remove any doubt as to
the effect of attachment in garnishment in Illinois. The Illinois General
Assembly sought to remove any possibility that in a future case the
Supreme Court of the United States might give the Illinois garnishment
statute in the form in which it had been presented to the Court the
S6 292 U.S. 190, 2o6-207. 57 111. L. 1935, pp. 210, 214:15 (italics added).
sS 292 U.S. 190, 208.
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interpretation set forth by the minority in Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer
Works. Perhaps it was even hoped that a five-to-four decision would be
avoided. Through its legislature Illinois sought to give the greatest possi-
ble efficacy to attachment in garnishment. It sought, so to speak, to make
clear to Cardozo, J., and his associates in the minority that the will of
Illinois was that the Illinois statute regulating attachment in garnishment
be given the effect permitted by the majority of the Supreme Court of the
United States. However, when one keeps in mind that the Supreme Court
of the nation has not overruled Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Sturm or Harris v. Balk, or subsequent cases affikming them, it seems that
this amendment of the Illinois statute gives little aid to the satisfactory
solution of the problem raised by the hypothetical case that has been
under consideration.
Discussion of the question whether service of the Illinois attachment
in garnishment created a "lien" is unfortunate and beside the point.
"Lien" is merely a word that denotes a group of legal relations. The
relations that are said to constitute a "lien" in one case may be quite
different from those relations that are said to constitute a "lien" in an-
other. For example, liens may be "legal" or "equitable"-the relations
may be cognizable in a court of law or only in a court of equity. The legal
relations that give an innkeeper a "lien" on the trunk of a non-paying
"guest" obviously will differ from the legal relations that are said to con-
stitute a "lien" on an intangible chose in action. Without doubt both
groups in the United States Supreme Court agreed that service of attach-
ment in garnishment in Illinois did alter the legal relations between the
garnishee debtor corporations and the principal debtor (Sanders) and that
such service also altered the legal relations between the principal creditor
(Armour Fertilizer Works) and the garnishee debtor corporations.5 9 It
seems useless to speak of the change as giving or as not giving rise to a
lien. The reason why jurisdiction to garnish exists in a state with personal
jurisdiction of a garnishee debtor is not that service of the garnishment
writ creates a "lien"-that it causes a change in the legal relations. That
is the point at issue-whether service of such a writ should cause any such
change. A state that has physical power over a garnishee debtor has
power to attach unpleasant consequences to a failure on the latter's part
to obey the writ and any subsequent judgment. That fact probably ex-
plains why jurisdiction to garnish was held to be with a state that had
personal jurisdiction of the garnishee debtor. °
s9 Cf. statements of majority in 292 U.S. 190, 203-204 with statements of minority in 292
U.S. 190, 2o6-207.
60 See Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710, 716, i9 Sup .Ct. 797,
8oo (I899).
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.IV
The problem presented in that hypothetical case is one of a type that
arises in a situation in which two or more states have enacted statutes
that in operation may conflict with one another, but none of which are
violative of the federal Constitution. We have seen from the prior dis-
cussion of certain United States Supreme Court cases that jurisdiction
for garnishment exists in any state in which a garnishee debtor may be
sued by his creditor-the so-called debtor-creditor. If the garnishee
debtor is a corporation doing business in more than one state, each of
those states may enact a statute providing for the garnishment of a debt
such corporation owes. Each of those statutes is within the legislative
competence, under the federal Constitution, of the enacting state. It does
not follow, however, that each statute is entitled to full faith and credit in
every other state. So to hold would result in a hopeless clash. The duty
is cast ultimately on the Supreme Court to decide which state in a particu-
lar set of facts makes out the stronger case for extra-state recognition of
its statute.
The extension of full faith and credit to statutes has not been considered
by the Supreme Court as often as the giving of full faith and credit to
foreign judgments.6' However, authority is not lacking for the suggestion
that in the hypothetical case under consideration the problem is one of
selecting a statute for extra-state recognition. The Supreme Court of the
United States has undertaken a similar burden in deciding that Califor-
nia was entitled to enforce its own Workmen's Compensation Act in a
state of facts in which the California court could properly have given full
faith and credit to the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Act.62
In that case a contract of employment was executed in California
between a corporate employer and a non-resident alien for the latter's
employment in Alaska during a salmon-canning season. The contract
required the employer to transport the employee to Alaska. At the end
of the season it was to return him to San Francisco and there pay him
his wages, less advances. The contract stated that the parties had elected
to be bound by the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Act and stated that
the parties should be subject to and bound by the provisions thereof. The
Alaska statute made no distinction between residents and non-residents
and gave a remedy in the territorial courts to every employee injured in
the course of his employment in Alaska. The California Workmen's Com-
pensation Act was administered by a Commission and, as interpreted by
6x See 45 Yale L. J. 339 (1935).
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532
('935).
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the state courts, extended to injuries suffered outside of California if the
contract of hire was made therein. It further provided that exemption of
an employer from statutory liability could not be gained by any contract,
rule or regulation. After his return to California the employee (a non-
resident alien, as has been stated) applied for and received an award by
the California Commission for injuries suffered in the course of his Alaskan
employment. On petition for review by the state supreme court the
employer attacked the California Workmen's Compensation Act as in-
valid under due process and more particularly it challenged the statute
as denying due process insofar as it denied validity to the agreement that
the parties should be bound by the Alaska statute and insofar as it
attempted to give a remedy for injuries suffered outside of the state. The
employer also pleaded that the application of the California statute re-
sulted in a denial of full faith and credit to the Alaska statute insofar as
the latter statute provided for an exclusive remedy in the territory. The
award by the California Commission was upheld by the supreme court of
the state.63
The judgment of the state court was affirmed by the federal Supreme
Court, which assumed that in Alaska "the employee, had he chosen to
do so, could have claimed the benefits of the Alaska statute, and that
if any effect were there given to the California statute, it would be only
by comity or by virtue of the full faith and credit clause.63a
Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes,
lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a con-
flicting statute of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden
of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those
of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.6 4
Equally significant for present purposes is the statement that
The interest of Alaska is not shown to be superior to that of California. No per-
suasive reason is shown for denying to California the right to enforce its own laws
in its own courts, and in the circumstances the full faith and credit clause does not
require that the statutes of Alaska be given that effect.fs
Return to the hypothetical case. Consider the task of the federal court
in Texas in the interpleader suit instituted by the Garnishee Company.
That court obtains some light as to how to dispose of the contentions of
the various parties from the case of Alaska Packers Association v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission, the case just stated. The Texas federal court
63 1 Cal. (2d) 250, 34 P. (2d) 716 (1934).
63& Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532,
540 (1935).
64 Id. at 547-48. 63 Id. at 550.
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must make some disposition of the fund paid in by the Garnishee Com-
pany. Sanders claims to be entitled to it by virtue of the Texas home-
stead statutes, X by virtue of the garnishment suit he instituted in state
S-i, and Armour Fertilizer Works by virtue of its garnishment suit in
Illinois. It may be assumed that the court disregards the claim of Sanders.
The garnishment statutes of both Illinois and state S-i seem to be con-
stitutional. It would not follow that each was entitled to extra-state
recognition. The federal court in Texas must decide which statute, in the
light of all the facts, is the statute of the state with the "superior inter-
est." How is this decision to be made? Various factors may be material.
Perhaps X is to be "preferred on the ground that in his garnishment suit
in state S-i he was able to secure personal service on Sanders, whereas in
Illinois Armour Fertilizer Works was not able to secure such service upon
the principal debtor. In other words, the statute of state S-i would be
the statute of the state with the "superior interest." But suppose that the
debt from Sanders to Armour Fertilizer Works was contracted in the
course of a business conducted on behalf of Sanders in Illinois. That fact,
along with the priority in service of the Illinois garnishment over the
service of garnishment in state S-i, might well lead the court in the
interpleader suit to hold that the Illinois garnishment statute had been
enacted by the state with the "superior interest" and to award to Armour
Fertilizer Works the fund paid into court by the Garnishee Company.
- In many cases it may be that priority in filing suit or in serving the gar-
nishee will be held the decisive factor in determining what state has the
"superior interest," but in many others such priority may well be con-
sidered as not decisive.
Consider how this theory of "superior interest" might work in another
hypothetical case.
CASE II
Armour Fertilizer Works sues Sanders in Illinois, serving him only
constructively, but serving the Garnishee Company, a Connecticut insur-
ance company that is lawfully transacting business in Illinois, with an
attachment in garnishment. As before, Sanders puts in no appearance
and judgment is rendered against him by default. The Garnishee Com-
pany in its answer admits its indebtedness to Sanders, but sets up his
claim of exemption under the Texas homestead statutes. Meanwhile
Sanders has sued the insurance company, the Garnishee Company, in a
state court in Texas, in which state the Garnishee Company is subject
to service of process. While this Texas action is pending, and prior to
disposition of the issues raised by the answer of the Garnishee Company
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in the Illinois action, the Garnishee Company files a bill in interpleader
against Sanders and Armour Fertilizer Works in the United States Dis-
trict Court in the district in Texas in which Sanders resides. The amount
due is paid into court, the Garnishee Company is discharged and injunc-
tions issue restraining further prosecutions of the actions in the state
courts of Illinois and Texas. What decree shall the court render in the
interpleader suit?
Here, again, the court will not be primarily concerned with the rights
of a garnishee since the Garnishee Company has paid its debt and ob-
tained a complete discharge. As in the case before the United States
Supreme Court and in Case I, Armour Fertilizer Works "asks nothing
under any Texas law." 6 Under the circumstances now supposed it has
been brought into the United States District Court against its will and
protest. By virtue of its garnishment action in Illinois it claims the
proceeds of the policy to the exclusion of Sanders. He, however, does ask
something of Texas law-he claims the proceeds of the debt to him from
the Garnishee Company as exempt from attachment or garnishment
under Texas statute. Presumably the court here also is to "weigh the
right or title of each claimant under the law of the state in which it arose,
and determine which according to equity is the better. ' 6 7 The fact that
interpleader is brought in Texas does not necessarily mean that the court
is to enforce exemptions given by Texas statutes. 8
As has already been stated, the majority of the United States Supreme
Court in the actual case of Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works found that
Armour Fertilizer Works had, by service of the Illinois attachment in
garnishment, acquired a lien on the garnished debt, subject to defeasance
if certain subsequent events happened.69 Becker v. Illinois Central R. R.
Co. shows that one of such subsequent events would have been the recov-
ery of a judgment in Texas by Sanders prior to the entry of a judgment
against the garnishees in Illinois.
In this second hypothetical case now under consideration Armour Fer-
tilizer Works, following the reasoning of the majority in the United
States Supreme Court, would contend (i) that the garnishment proceed-
ings in Illinois gave it a "superior equity" to the proceeds of the debt
that the Garnishee Company had paid into the federal court in Texas;
(2) that had it secured an Illinois judgment against the Garnishee Com-
66 292 U.S. 190, 200.
67 Ibid. The court here quotes from the Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in 63 F. (2d) 902,
9o6 (C.C.A. 5th 1933).
6 Ibid. 69 Id. at 203.
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pany prior to any judgment against that company in Texas in favor of
Sanders, its "lien" would have become absolute; and (3) that it would be
inequitable to declare that because it had not been able, by reason of the
injunction issued by the federal court in Texas, to get such final judgment
in Ilinois, Sanders had in some way become entitled to priority. On the
other hand, Sanders would contend that (i) under the law of Illinois as
laid down in Becker v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., his "equity" would have
prevailed had he secured a Texas judgment against the Garnishee Com-
pany before Armour Fertilizer Works secured a judgment against that
company as garnishee in Illinois; and (2) because he had been enjoined
from securing such judgment, it would be inequitable to hold that in
some way Armour Fertilizer Works had become entitled to priority.
Perhaps Sanders' claim would be denied. It is hard to see, however,
why Armour Fertilizer Works would, on the reasoning of the majority of
the United States Supreme Court, be entitled to prevail. Its claim is
subject to the same objections as, so it is submitted, might be made to
its claim in Case I. There is no need of restating them.
In this second hypothetical case the only real contest is between San-
ders and his garnishing creditor. The federal court in Texas might well
allow that creditor, Armour Fertilizer Works, to prevail. Illinois, the
state enacting the garnishment statute, might be held to have an "inter-
est" to be regarded as "superior" to that of Texas, the state enacting the
homestead exemption statute that is involved. True, if this result is
reached, the exemptions allowed Sanders by the law of his domicil, which
is also the forum, are not secured to him. A federal court may, indeed,
allow the same exemptions from execution and garnishment as are allowed
under the law of the state in which such federal court sits;70 but in inter-
pleader suits a court is properly less influenced by the law of the forum
than in many other types of litigation. As a matter of fact the Supreme
Court in Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works refused to enforce any claim
of Sanders to exemption under Texas law.7' Neither the fact that Sanders
is domiciled in Texas nor the fact that interpleader is brought in a federal
court in that state is sufficient to require the court to hold that Sanders
is entitled to the exemptions extended by the Texas homestead statutes.
If the debt from Sanders to Armour Fertilizer Works had been contracted
in Illinois for goods sold and delivered to him there, the court might well
consider that Illinois had the "superior interest," especially if at the time
7o 17 Stat. 197 (1872); 36 Stat. 1167 (i9ii); 28 U.S.C.A. § 727 (1928).
7' 292 U.S. io, 200, where the court quotes from the opinion of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in 63 F. (2d) 902, 9o6 (C.C.A. 1933).
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the sale was made Sanders was residing in Illinois. The court might then
feel that the fund in court should be awarded to Sanders' creditor. More-
over, exemptions from garnishment have been said to be only "remedial,"
i.e., a matter of procedure to be regulated by the law of the forum, not
by the law of the principal debtor's domicil.72 In view of the decision in
Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works it is doubtful whether Texas would
be held to be the state with the "superior interest" merely because the
premises insured were situated within its borders.
If this solution of the problem presented by the two hypothetical cases
is followed, then the Garnishee Company is no longer an indifferent stake-
holder. For example, in Case II, suppose that as soon as the Garnishee
Company was garnished in Illinois Sanders started suit in Texas against
the Garnishee Company. That company would not be under any duty
to take advantage of the Federal Interpleader Act. It could await the
outcome of the two suits in Illinois and Texas. If the Illinois court were
the first to enter a judgment against it, Texas would be obliged to give
full faith and credit to such judgment. If the Texas court were the first
with judgment, Illinois would, under Becker v. Illinois Central R. R. Co.,
give full faith and credit to the Texas judgment. If the Garnishee Com-
pany in some way, by pleading or otherwise, brought to the attention of
each court the pendency of the suit in the other, and gave Sanders proper
notice of the garnishment action, it would be secure from double liability
in the United States. However, if the Garnishee Company took advantage
of the Federal Interpleader Act to file interpleader in a federal court, it
would cause the rights of the contesting claimants to be determined by a
body of rules developed by federal courts as herein suggested. As will
hereinafter be suggested, the chances are that the Garnishee Company,
whenever possible, will choose to take advantage of the Federal Inter-
pleader Act.
In Case I if the Garnishee Company chooses to interplead under the
72 See Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710, 717-18 (1899).
Statutes may, of course, give a non-resident the same exemptions from garnishment as are
allowed in the state of his residence. See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, c. 52, 22 (wages
earned and payable out of Illinois); Vt. Pub. L. 1933, § 1754 ("nor shall a corporation be
adjudged a trustee by reason of any money due from it to a person residing without the state
for services rendered without the state, provided a like sum of money so due would be exempt
from attachment by trustee process in the state where such person resides"). Some statutes
exempt from garnishment wages earned and payable out of the state if the principal cause of
action arose out of the state, unless the principal debtor is served personally in the garnishment
suit. E.g., Ill Rev. Stat. 1935, c. 52, 23; Iowa Code 1935, § 11769; Carroll's Ky. Stat. 193o ,
§ 17oa; Tenn. Code 1932, § 9429.
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federal statute, rights of competing garnishing creditors are no longer
settled by any race to priority of judgment in state courts. At the election
of the Garnishee Company the rights of such competing creditors will
now be a matter for adjudication according to a body of federal law built
up by federal courts. State courts must still bow to such decisions as
Harris v. Balk. Side by side with the rules imposed by the Supreme Court
of the United States on the state courts in the matter of jurisdiction to
garnish debts will grow up a body of jurisprudence administered only in
federal courts in contests involving competing garnishing creditors
brought into the federal courts at the election of supposedly indifferent
stakeholders. In this new federal jurisprudence the courts should be able
to avoid some of the questionable reasoning used in Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm and Harris v. Balk.73 There will be no need to
discuss the "situs" of a debt for purposes of garnishment. There will be
no need to resort to an "implied" agency in the garnishee creditor to sue
the garnishee debtor as "agent" for the debtor-creditor. Out of place
should be talk of "liens" and "inchoate liens" created by service of at-
tachment in garnishment. In these cases the courts will have to consider
the relationship of different states to the debt or debts alleged to exist
between one or more principal creditors and a debtor-creditor and the
relationship of those states to the debt from the debtor-creditor to the
garnishee debtor. The relationship of some one state to these debts will
be held the closest. That state will be held to have a "superior interest"
entitling it to garnish the garnishee debtor at the suit of some one principal
creditor. That "interest" will be "superior" to the "interest" of any
other state to provide for the garnishment of the same debt by some other
principal creditor. Or, in some cases like the second hypothetical, it may
be that no state will have an "interest" to garnish "superior" to the
"interest" of the state in which the debtor-creditor has sued the garnishee
and the debtor-creditor will be allowed to recover in his own behalf.
The Federal Interpleader Act is broad in scope. It authorizes bills of
interpleader
by any person, firm, corporation, association, or society .... having issued a note,
bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument of the value or amount of
$5oo or more, or providing for the delivery or payment or the loan of money or prop-
erty at such amount or value, or being under any obligation written or unwritten to
the amount of $5oo or more.74
73 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 129-3o (1927); Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem
to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 107, 121-22 (1913).
74 49 Stat. 1o96 (1936); 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (26) (1926) (as amended).
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The field for interpleader under this statute by a corporate garnishee
is wide. The statute does not compel such a garnishee to take advantage
of the privileges offered by it, but the benefits of so doing are so great that
it is difficult to believe that a corporate garnishee will fail to make use of
the privileges of the statute when opportunity offers. It is impossible to
secure corresponding benefits in a state court due to the fact that the
process of a state court does not run beyond the state boundaries.7 5 For
example, suppose that a citizen of state S-i claims a "lien" on the proceeds
of a $iooo fire insurance policy by virtue of an attachment in garnishment
served on the insurer in that state in a suit brought by the citizen of state
S-i against a citizen of state S-2, the policyholder, in which the defendant
was served only by publication and did not appear. Suppose, also, that
a citizen of state S-3 claims a "lien" on the same proceeds by virtue of an
attachment in garnishment served on the insurer in that state in a suit
brought by the citizen of state S-3 against the citizen of state S-2, the
policyholder, in which the defendant was also served only by publication
and did not appear. Suppose, further, that the citizen of state S-2, the
policyholder, claims the proceeds on the theory that they are exempt from
attachment in garnishment by virtue of the exemption statutes of state
S-2, the state of his domicil and the state in which the property insured
was located. The insurance company cannot force the citizens of states
S-i and S-3 into a state court in state S-2 to interplead there with the
citizen of state S-2. If there were no Federal Interpleader Act, the insur-
ance company would be obliged to take care that it followed in each
garnishment suit the course of conduct suggested for a garnishee in
Harris v. Balk. It would be obliged to do so if it wished to be in a position
to plead effectively a judgment entered against it as garnishee in bar of
further prosecution of any action that the citizen of state S-2 might later
institute against it on the policy as well as in bar of further prosecution of
the garnishment suit in the other of the two states S-i and S-3 . In prac-
tice the insurance company will often find itself vexed by two or more
suits. Under the Federal Interpleader Act the insurer could interplead
the different claimants in one suit in the federal district court of the
district in which one (or more) of the claimants resides . 6 By payment
of the amount involved into court or by giving a bond conditioned upon
its compliance with the future order or decree of the court with respect
to the subject matter of the controversy 7 the insurer could obtain relief
7s New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 519 (ii6).
7649 Stat. io96 (1936); 28 U.S.C.A. § 4i (26) (i926) (as amended). 77 Ibid.
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from double or multiple vexation. Further discussion of the benefits of
the Federal Interpleader Act would be a work of supererogation in view
of the able discussion of the statute elsewhere78 With the stakeholder
dismissed from further litigation in such cases as that which has just been
briefly described the federal courts will have broad opportunities to de-
velop sensible principles as to when one of several creditors of a debtor
is entitled to priority in having his claim satisfied out of a debt due that
debtor from a corporation that is doing business in more than one state.
However, the cases will be many and the years long before these prin-
ciples will be clearly enunciated.
78 Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of x936,45 Yale L. J. 963 ff., ii6i ff. (1936).
